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Labeling Policies in Food Markets: 
Private Incentives, Public 
Intervention, and Welfare Effects 
Angelo M. Zago and Daniel Pick 
This study considers the welfare impact of labeling policies of agricultural commod- 
ities with speci6c  characteristics. Using a model of vertical differentiation, the effects 
on equilibrium and welfare levels are calculated. The introduction of the regulation 
and the emergence of two differentiated competitive markets leaves consumers and 
high-quality producers better off, while low-quality producers are worse off. With 
high costs and low quality differences,  the total welfare impact of the regulation can 
be negative. Findings show that when high-quality producers can exercise market 
power, the regulation could be more easily accepted by producers, but it would have 
a negative effect on consumers. 
Key words:  asymmetric information, food markets, labeling, market power, vertical 
differentiation, welfare effects 
Introduction 
This study considers the  intervention of the  European Union (EU)  in markets for typical 
products, i.e., agricultural commodities or finished products with specific organoleptic 
characteristics related to a production area or technology. According to widespread 
beliefs, markets for typical products are impaired by inadequate asymmetric informa- 
tion: higher quality products cannot be recognized as such by consumers with higher 
willingness to pay, and thus high-quality producers cannot have appropriate incentives. 
The objective of this analysis is to investigate the welfare effects of the EU regulation 
which grants producer groups the right to label typical products to make them easily 
recognizable by consumers. However, the results are more general, and the analysis 
encompasses similar emerging issues in other markets and types of regulations.' 
With the MacSharry reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (1992), the EU has 
changed its  approach to agricultural policies,  with a major emphasis on nondistortionary 
policy interventions. At the same time, the EU has instituted a series of  policies to 
increase the  diversification of agricultural production to achieve a better balance between 
supply and demand and to benefit the rural economy, in particular of less-favored and 
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remote areas. One intervention  following these broad objectives is Regulation No. 2081/92 
on the protection of Products with Geographical Indications (PGIs)  and Designations of 
Origin (PDOs). This regulation recognizes that consumers are attaching greater 
importance to the quality of foodstuffs, and "in order to be able to make the best choice 
they [consumers]  must be given clear and succinct information regarding the origin of 
the product ...."  The regulation's aim is to recognize, protect, and foster trade among 
Member States of PGI and PDO products to secure higher incomes for farmers in return 
for a genuine effort to improve quality.' 
Since the pioneering contribution of  Akerlof (19701, economists and policy makers 
have become increasingly aware of  the importance of  information for the proper func- 
tioning of  markets. Most are familiar with the many instances of  market failures due 
to information problems, and many agree on the need to overcome them in order to in- 
crease social welfare. What is more controversial, though, is whether a public interven- 
tion (e.g., Stiglitz, 1996)  or the emergence of  a different institution, such as warranties, 
reputation, labeling, etc., is the most suitable correction. 
The regulation investigated in this study aims to increase both consumers7  and 
producers' surplus. According to the regulator, consumers with higher willingness  to pay 
get what they pay for, while producers find the incentives to provide the quality level 
sought by richer consumers and ensure themselves higher profits. This investigation 
undertakes a welfare analysis of  the regulation and argues that, although the motives 
are noble, the results may be welfare decreasing. 
The next section provides a review of  the relevant literature and gives some back- 
ground information about the impact of  the regulation. The model is then introduced. 
By choosing assumptions carefully,  we always make the choices that are  more optimistic 
about the impact of the regulation. In other words, a best-case scenario  approach is used 
for the regulator, and it is assumed there is a market failure and a need for public 
intervention because we have a credence good, for which private or market institutions 
(e.g., branding, intermediaries, forward integration, etc.) may not emerge or fully resolve 
the information asymmetry. In addition, the market regulation is allowed to work 
perfectly, in the sense that once introduced it is trusted and perfectly observed by 
 consumer^.^ 
In general, findings indicate the impact on consumers' welfare depends on the charac- 
teristics of the product, on technology conditions, and on the degree of  market competition 
associated with the label. For producers, those granted labeling rights will gain while 
other producers will lose. These results may not be surprising. However, we go a step 
further and show, depending on demand and technology parameters and on the costs 
of  managing the regulation, the change in total welfare may be negative despite the 
potential gains to consumers and to those producers who are protected by the regula- 
tion. We therefore argue that a careful cost-benefit analysis is needed when deciding 
whether to grant the label to a group of  producers. 
The scope of the regulation is limited to commodities with a link to geographical origin. The link and the specific quality, 
reputation, or other characteristics attributable to the area and the production-processing-preparation  practices must be 
proven during the application  and are evaluated by the EU. For more details on the regulation and its effects on the demand 
for a particular product, see, e.g., Loureiro and McCluskey (2000). 
'  This best-case scenario may not be very realistic. For example, many of the products using the regulation were already 
well known by consumers [e.g.,  Italian (Arfini, 1999), French, and Greek cheeses]. Clearly, when there is no need for the 
regulation, or when it  does not work properly, things would not improve compared with this benchmark scenario,  which may 
be considered an upper bound for the welfare effects of the regulation. 152  April 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
The analysis also considers the possibility that producers may exercise some market 
power following the introduction of the regulation. The success of this form of label or 
brand owned by producers in fact rests on their ability "to restrict additional production 
from within the group  ...," from which ability "comes freedom from the boom-bust price 
cycles associated with commodity markets  ..."  (Hayes, Lence, and Stoppa, 2003, p. 5). But 
we show that this ability by producers is always associated with a negative welfare 
effect for consumers, which may outweigh the benefits associated with the creation of 
the new market for differentiated commodities. Following a discussion of some policy 
implications, concluding remarks are provided, and suggestions are offered for some 
extensions and further research areas. 
The Regulation and Related Literature 
Since 1992, many products have been proposed by producers and their organizations to 
be recognized as Products with Geographical Indications (PGIs) or with Designations 
of  Origin (PDOs). By the end of  1999, approximately 530 products were granted the 
right to use these labels. The major countries benefiting from the regulation are France 
(22% of granted labels), followed by Italy (20%),  Greece and Portugal (both 14%),  and 
Germany (11%). While for France and Germany the majority of products labeled were 
local breads and beers, for Italy and other Southern Europe countries the products in- 
cluded cheeses, meat products, fruits and vegetables, and olive oil (Nomisma, 2000). 
The importance of information for the proper hnctioning of  markets is well known 
and documented. Since the pioneering work of Akerlof (1970) and Klein and Leffler 
(1981),  economists have investigated the  causes of and remedies for market failures due 
to the lack of information on product quality. It has been shown that the suboptimal 
equilibria resulting from these information problems may be improved through the emer- 
gence of different institutions in the form, for example, of warranties, certification (De 
and Nabar, 1991), signaling and reputation (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Shapiro, 19831, 
and various intermediaries (Spulber, 1999). 
It is common in the economics literature to distinguish goods according to whether 
their quality can be identified by consumers. The quality of search goods is  easily 
detected before consumption. For experience goods, consumers need to actually consume 
the good before being able to discern its intrinsic quality. For credence or trust goods, 
quality can never be known by consumers with certainty (Nelson, 1970).  While for search 
and experience goods the emergence of market "remedies" for quality assurance can be 
relatively effective and sufficient to avoid market failures (LafTont and Tirole, 1991), in 
the case of credence goods, the instances in which suboptimal equilibria exist are more 
common (Darby and Karni, 1973). 
In studies of the food industries, recent contributions recognize that many aspects of 
food quality and safety can be considered credence attributes (Antle, 1996; Caswell and 
Mojduszka, 1996; Crespi and Marette, 2001; Giannakas, 2002; Giannakas and Fulton, 
2002; McCluskey, 2000; Mojduszka and Caswell, 2000). Although the  theoretical contri- 
butions dealing with credence goods in general are relatively few, their applications to 
food industries are  increasing. Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina (1998) consider the case 
of the dispute over hormone-treated beef between the EU and the United States, and 
conclude the positive effect of trade liberalization on welfare may be offset by the increase 
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In a related paper, Marette, Crespi, and Schiavina (1999) investigate the impact of 
common labeling by a cartel of producers when there is asymmetric information about 
product quality. They find, with high cost of labeling, a cartel providing information 
about product quality may improve total welfare even when colluding to reduce output. 
Anania and Nisticb (2002)  consider different scenarios for a public regulation, according 
to which degree of "trust" or credibility the regulation can obtain from consumers. Auriol 
and  Schilizzi (1999)  investigate quality signaling through certification with fxed  certifi- 
cation costs, and conclude the costlier the certification, the higher the need for public 
intervention. Based on findings of a study examining credence goods, Kirchhoff (1999) 
reports firms may voluntarily over-comply in environmental labeling, i.e., produce high 
quality even when doing so implies giving up short-run profits. Extending previous 
results in the literature, Ibanez (1998) shows the market is able to generate ineffi- 
ciencies if the population has a certain pro-social behavior. 
The Model 
The model builds on the earlier work of Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina (1998)  and  con- 
siders a vertically differentiated market. The startingpoint of the analysis is  a situation 
in which a good may present different quality levels but appears undifferentiated to 
consumers. Indeed, let us assume a credence good for which consumers are  not able to 
distinguish between different variants of the same ~omrnodity.~  It  is also assumed the 
producers who are granted the label by the regulator are really producing a better 
commodity, i.e., the regulator is unbiased and can perfectly detect the quality of  the 
~omrnodity.~  By introducing the label, the superior version of the good becomes recog- 
nizable by consumers and can be distinguished from the lower quality variants. In 
practice, the  regulation creates two distinct products: one with the  label, with higher 
quality, sold to consumers with a higher willingness to pay, and the other with a lower 
quality level. 
Consider an agricultural commodity as a credence good: its quality can vary and is 
not known by consumers either before or after consumption. Some consumers would be 
willing to pay more for a better variant of the commodity in which characteristics are 
linked to special features  of the production technology  andlor area of production because 
they believe they would get higher utility from its consumption. The regulator can 
alleviate the problem of asymmetric information by granting a label to those producers 
who follow certain rules and by helping them to establish a reputation for higher 
quality. It  is assumed the  regulator knows with certainty which firm produces the high- 
quality product or from which production areas  the  commodity comes. For this and other 
reasons, consumers trust the public provision of the ~ertification.~ 
It  is  reasonable to assume the quality, s, of the  good under consideration is  exogenous. 
It  depends on the  peculiar climate and soil conditions, and on some traditional practices 
Credence goods are considered first because it is reasonable to think that in many instances consumers are not able to 
discern whether a commodity is really from a particular area andlor has been produced with a particular technology. In 
addition,  some eligible commodities may also have some experience attributes,  but with experience goods, institutions may 
emerge to solve the information problem without government intervention.  As explained in the introduction, this analysis 
seeks to give the regulator the best conditions for the regulation to be needed and to work properly. 
The analysis does not consider political economy pressures,  which could lead to a situation in which some differentiating 
qualities are 'exaggeratedn in  the label. 
"or  a paper which explicitly considers when the certi6cation is only partially trusted, see Anania and Nisticb (2002). 154  April 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
the regulation intends to preserve. Thus, the quality can be either low (s,)  or high (s,).' 
Assume there is an exogenous number of  producers: n,  producers of  the low-quality 
variety (s,)  of the commodity, and n,  producers of  the higher quality (s,).'  Producers 
from different areas  have different  production technologies and costs ofproduction. Also, 
producers specializing  in the high-quality commodity are  assumed to use a more restric- 
tive (costly)  technology-i.e.,  because they follow traditional techniques,  or because even 
though they have a potential for high quality, this technology simply requires more 
effort. 
Let us assume a quadraticg cost function: 0.5c,(q,~)~n~,  where qijc?ll+  is the quantity 
level of the type i = L,H  commodity for the individual producer j;  ci is a cost parameter 
such that  c,  <  c,;  and ni ensures constant-returns-to-scale  technology. To begin, consider 
individual producers  j as price takers. Their profit is given by the following: 
The optimal level of  individual production is qij  =pilcini,  while the aggregate supply is 
the summation of individual supplies: 
Note that &(p)  = QL(pL)  + QH(pH)  = (pLIcL)  + (pH/cH)' 
To represent consumer preferences, consider a demand structure a la Mussa and 
Rosen (1978).  Consumers can choose one unit of the good with quality s. If they consume 
it, they receive the following utility: 
where 0 is a taste parameter which represents different intensity of  preferences for 
quality, and p is the price of the good of  quality s. Assume the taste parameter 0 is dis- 
tributed uniformly over the interval 0  E [@,  GI,  and the distribution is normalized such 
that 8 = 0 and 8 = l.1° The consumers will consume as long as 0 > pls. 
The respective expressions for consumers' and producers' surplus are: 
-  - 
(0s -p)d0  and  PS,  = 
where [&81  and [q,  -  GI are generic integration intervals. 
In models with vertical differentiation, it is also possible to have endogenous quality when firms may invest in quality 
improvement, incurring either an increase of fixed or variable costs. For an in-depth analysis of endogenous quality in the 
food industries, see Sutton (1991). 
It  is reasonable to assume no entry for the high-quality producers, since quality is linked to a particular area where the 
essential factors of production  (e.g., land) are given. The case of low-quality products ia different, because these products may 
be replicated somewhere else. The analysis concentrates on the short-run impact and leaves the free-entry case as a possible 
extension. The reader should be aware that with free entry, different results could emerge. 
'Following Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina (19981, the quadratic form is chosen for simplicity  and ease of calculation. How- 
ever, the qualitative nature of results should be robust to the exponent in the variable cost function. 
lo This corresponds  to a situation in  which the market is not covered, i.e., some consumers prefer not to buy the commodity 
offered. The other case is when the market is covered, which we do not consider for the moment. When a market is covered, 
demand cannot be inverted, and so quantity competition  B la Cournot cannot be used (Motta, 1993, p.  116). Zago and Pick  Labeling Policies in Food Markets  155 
Before the Regulation: 
The Undifferentiated Market 
Consider the case before the regulation, when one indistinguishable variety of the good 
is offered, and assume that in equilibrium both variants of  the commodity are sold but 
consumers are  not able to distinguish between them. With a unique price in the market, 
consumers form expectations about the quality of the commodity they buy. Using 
rational expectations,  consumers expect that  the average quality of the undistinguished 
commodity is the weighted (by the relative quantity) average of  the quality levels of the 
two varieties of  the good. The expected quality is then the following: 
Since consumers are  implicitly risk-neutral, the demand for the good of quality S sold 
at price p may be determined by the following expression: 
where 8, represents the consumer who is indifferent  between buying and not buying the 
good, and thus 8,  =PIS.  Recalling that 8 = 1,  then the demand, when there is only one 
undistinguished good offered,  is specified as D(p,  3) = 1  - (PIS 1. 
The equilibrium quantity and price can be determined by setting the (aggregate) 
supply equal to the demand: Q(p) = (p,lc,)  + (pHIcH)  = 1  - (PIS) = D(p),  to obtain the 
following: 
where E = (c,c,)/(c,  + c,).  Here, the superscript notation refers to an equilibrium, while 
the subscript refers to the different types, i.e., producers of  the low-quality variety (s,) 
of  the commodity or of  the high-quality variety (s,). 
The levels of  consumers' and producers' surplus (avoiding the intermediate calcula- 
tions) are denoted by:11,12 
B  a 2~ 2 
PSB,  = JOqH(p" cHq)dq  = 
2cH(E + 3)' ' 
S 2,5 2 
PSB,  = g(p"  c,q)dq  = 
2cL(E + S I2 
l1 The letter "Bn  in the terms CSB,  PSB,,  and PSB, stands for "beforen  the regulation 
12  Consumers  do not know individual goods or firms, but can form some expectations on their distribution. This assumption, 
which allows us to 6nd an equilibrium, is similar to that used in principal-agent models, where the principal knows the 
distribution of the efficiency parameter in the firms' population but does not know the efficiency of the individual firm. 156  April2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
The resulting level of total welfare, which can be considered the  benchmark when 
evaluating the effects of the regulation, is: 
TWB = CSB + PSB,  + PSB,  =  g2?(1  +s?) 
2(E  + s )2 
The Effects of the Regulation 
Now we consider the case in  which, after the  regulation, consumers can distinguish 
between two goods offered at quality s,  and sH,  with s,  < sH,  and at  prices ofp,  and  pH, 
withp, <pH.  In  this case, there are two indifferent consumers. The first, 8,  is indifferent 
between the high-quality and the low-quality good, i.e., 6sH  -pH  = 6sL -p,,  such that 
8 = (pH  -pL)/(sH  - s,). The other consumer, 0,,  is indifferent between buying the low- 
quality good and not buying at all, i.e., O,sL  -p,  = 0,  such that 0,  =p,/s,.  The demand 
for the two goods is expressed as  follows: 
The Competitive Case 
Following  the  regulation, two competitive markets emerge: one for the  high-quality type 
of the commodity, and the other for its low-quality variety. The aggregate supplies in 
the  two markets are Q,(p,)  = p,  /cL and &,(pH)  = pH/cH.  The equilibrium quantities and 
prices in both markets are: 
2  where o = cLcH  + cHsL  -  s,  + cLsH  + sLsH7  and As  = sH  -  s,.  The superscript c refers to the 
competitive scenario equilibrium, while the subscript refers to the different quality 
levels, high and low. 
Given the equilibrium quantities and prices, the level of  consumers' surplus in the 
competitive scenario is designated by 
CSAL  = L0(0sL  -  pL) d0 and  CSAi =  - (OsH -  pi)  d0 
0  L1 
for low and high quality, respectively.13 
The costs of  the administration of the program-the  expenditures for the process of 
getting the EU recognition, for drawing and administering the rules for production and 
trade, etc.-are  borne by the high-quality producers. It  is reasonable to consider these 
lSACin  these expressions stands  for "after"  the  regulation, 'competitive" scenario. The equations for CSA', CSA;,  and CSAL 
are not reported because of space limitations, but are available from the authors upon request. Zago and Pick  Labeling Policies in Food Markets  157 
costs as fixed (Auriol and Schilizzi, 1999; Ibanez, 1998),  and set them equal to F.14  Taking 
into account the equilibrium quantities and prices that emerge and the fxed expendi- 
tures for the program, surplus levels for producers are denoted by: 
PSA  = PSAL + PSAL  = (cLc;s,2 + cH(cLsH  + s~As)~)/~u~  - F. 
The regulation aims to improve both consumers' and producers' surplus. As explained 
in the introduction, our choices regarding the model represent the best-case scenario 
from the point of view of the regulator (e.g., the regulation is needed),  and the regulation 
is trusted and recognized by consumers as well. The results of the comparison between 
the welfare levels before and after the introduction of  the regulation are summarized 
below. 
PROPOSITION  1. With  competitive markets, after the regulation, consumers'consump- 
tion and surplus aregreater. Production and surplus are lower for  low-qualitypro- 
ducers and higher for high-quality  producers. 
Intuitively, before the regulation, consumers are forced to consume a commodity of 
uncertain quality due to imperfect information. Once a well-functioning regulation is 
introduced and markets remain competitive, consumers can choose according to the 
quality they prefer and are willing to pay for. For high-quality consumers, given that 
quality level is higher after the regulation, consumption and total surplus increase. For 
low-quality consumers, the quality level and the quantity consumed are lower, since 
these consumers  did benefit from the uncertainty about quality prior to the regulation.15 
For low-quality producers, the labeling decreases both the quantity demanded and 
the price they can receive; only low-quality consumers prefer their products, and thus 
they face a lower demand and their surplus decreases. For high-quality producers, the 
regulation increases surplus, since both quantity and price are higher than before the 
regulation. The size of the welfare impact on different agents depends on technology and 
demand conditions. To show the impact of  the regulation and some comparative statics, 
the results of  numerical simulations are reported.16 
The results show the impact of the regulation on economic welfare as  cH,  the marginal 
production cost of  high-quality producers, changes from 110%  to 250% of  c,, given sH  = 
1.1  and F  = 0.005 (figure l).17  The impact on consumers' surplus and high-quality produ- 
cer profits is positive but decreasing  with the increase in cost differences,  while negative 
l4 The case of administrative expenses affecting variable costs, considered for example by Crespi and Marette (2001),  is 
encompassed in our model, since c,  > c,. 
l5 This result is very similar to that of Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina (1998). 
'' Using Mathematica 4, we calibrate the model to have an initial situation with a functioning market even with uncer- 
tain quality, which is the case for many labeled products prior to the regulation (see footnote 3).  We normalize (c, = 1)  and 
(s, = I), and change (c,)  and (s,)  to have Merences in marginal costs and quality from 10% to 150%. Given the normaliza- 
tion of consumers' taste parameters, such that  = 0 and  = 1, the quantities, prices, and surplus levels are between zero 
and one. 
''  Fixed costs are chosen to be smaller than the increase in profits for the high-quality producers following the regulation. 
An  F  = 0.005  corresponds to  3-5% of high-quality producers' total revenues. 158  April2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
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Figure 1. Welfare impact with competitive markets 
but increasing with cost differences on low-quality producers' profits. To explain these 
impacts, two effects can be isolated. The first is the uncertainty about quality which 
penalizes high-quality producers and in part high-quality consumers, reducing their 
purchased quantity with no labeling. The other is related to the different production 
costs: if high-quality producers have much higher production costs, the positive surplus 
impact is reduced for these producers and consumers alike.'' 
In  addition to preferences and technology  conditions, the  overall impact of the  regula- 
tion depends on its administrative costs. If these costs are relatively high, the impact on 
welfare may be negative. Indeed, if there are small quality differences between the two 
variants of the commodity, but which are relatively expensive to obtain, the decrease in 
surplus for low-quality producers may outweigh the increase of high-quality producers' 
and consumers' surplus. In other words, there may be instances in which the regulation 
would not pass the  Kaldor-Hicks  (potential)  compensation  test (Just,  Hueth, and Schmitz, 
1982) in a hypothetical cost-benefit analysis. Results are summarized below. 
PROPOSITION  2. With competitive markets, thepositive welfare impact of  the regu- 
lation is higher as quality differences between the two variants of  the commodity 
increase, and as cost differences between differentproducers decrease. If  the admin- 
istrative costs of the regulation are high, quality differences low, and cost differences 
high, the regulation has a negative welfare effect. 
Since we are dealing with credence goods, markets are working, perhaps subopti- 
mally, prior to the regulation. In addition, the regulation is  financed by producers, and 
although its costs may be low enough to be profitably sustained by the high-quality 
producers, costs still may be high enough to have a negative impact on total welfare. 
This is a result one may find also in signaling models with costly separation (Riley, 
2001). Notice that specialty products are often produced and traded in local markets of 
limited size, for which administrative costs can be relatively high. 
18 Keeping c,  as  given and  varying s,  shows that the impact on consumers' surplus, on high-quality producers' profits, and 
on total welfare is positive and increasing with quality differences, while the impact on low-quality consumers' profits is 
negative and decreasing. The entire results are available from the authors upon request. Zago and Pick  Labeling Policies in Food Markets  159 
Market Power via Land Restrictions 
The regulation allows the group of  high-quality producers to label and regulate pro- 
duction and trade of  their specialty products. It is possible the group of  producers can 
exercise market power. One natural and relatively uncontroversial  practice would be to 
restrict the land producers may allocate to specialty products.1g  It  is assumed, when the 
producers are granted the label, they expand the area only partially following the 
regulati~n.~' 
Following the regulation, with land restrictions for high-quality production, two 
competitive markets emerge with the following aggregate supplies: QL(pL)  = pL/cL  and 
QH(pH)  = qH,  where qH  is the maximum amount of  land the group may allocate to spe- 
cialty products. The equilibrium quantities and prices that emerge are: 
where As  = sH  -  sL,  and the superscript r refers to the equilibrium of  the competitive 
scenario with restricted land. 
Notice that  both equilibrium  prices for high- and low-quality  products and production 
of  the low-quality variety are higher as restriction increases for the production of  spe- 
cialty products. Given the equilibrium quantities and prices, surplus for consumers and 
producers compared to the levels prior to the regulation are as  described in the following. 
PROPOSITION  3. With  supply restrictions after the regulation, the higher the quality 
differences between the two variants of the commodity, the bigger the negative impact 
on consumers' surplus and the positive surplus impact for  high-quality  producers. 
The regulation reduces the uncertainty about quality, and thus would allow high- 
quality consumers to increase their consumption of  the variant they prefer and are 
willing to pay for. If the group of  producers restricts the land allocated to the high- 
quality product, consumers find that the commodity they want is available in limited 
quantity, and this has a negative surplus impact on them. In addition, given that their 
utility depends on quality, the higher the quality differences  between the low- and high- 
quality variants of  the commodity, the bigger is, ceteris paribus, the negative impact 
(figure 2).  The result on consumers' surplus is probably not surprising,  because the 
''In  fact, the regulation recognizes those products with specialty traits related to the producing  region and likely not repro- 
ducible in other areas. Another option we considered in the analysis, partially reported here, is the exercise of market power 
by price determination. A last form of market power, not considered,  could be based on restrictions on the maximum yields 
allowed: often suggested as  a means to increase the quality of the raw commodity, it is a practice quite common, for example, 
with Appellation d'Origine wines. 
20 We arbitrarily assume an increase of 20% of land allocated to specialty products aRer the recognition by the regulator. 
The higher the increase in  allowed production-which  in our model corresponds  one-to-one to land-the  closer are the results 
to the competitive scenario previously considered.  Representingthe optimal choice of land (i.e., production),  we would obtain 
results similar to the case of price-6xing  considered  next in the text. Presumably, also with a different model based on a two- 
stage game (land allocation, then market competition),  similar results would be obtained. 160  April 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
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figure 2. Impact on welfare with land restrictions 
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figure 3. Total welfare impact of different market regimes 
negative result is driven by the  exercise of market power, whereby negative effects may 
outweigh the positive ones related to the creation of the new differentiated market. In 
other words, even with product differentiation and the emergence of a quality segment, 
the surplus effect on consumers will be negative if producers exercise market power. 
High-quality producers are the main beneficiaries of the regulation, and the positive 
impact is increasing with the quality differences. As one would expect, compared with 
competitive markets, the welfare impact of  the regulation is less positive with land 
restrictions, all else equal. If this latter restriction is binding, the impact on welfare is 
negative with a lower level of administrative costs. For example, if one considers what 
could be a reasonable scenario for the regulators to allow the label to be granted (high- 
quality differences, e.g., 50%,  between the  low- and high-quality variety, and  with high- 
quality production not much more costly, e.g., 25%), the impact of the regulation with 
land restrictions is negative for values of  the administrative expenses at F = 0.04, 
instead of F = 0.05 with competitive markets (figure 3). Zago and Pick  Labeling Policies in Food Markets  16 1 
Such value represents a fraction of  17%  of revenues after the regulati~n.~'  It seems 
unlikely such high levels of  administrative costs would occur in practice. Thus, when 
coupled with land restrictions by the  group of producers, the  regulation might be expected 
to have a negative effect on consumers' surplus. But, when granted to products with a 
high-quality potential associated with relatively inexpensive production costs and a 
reasonable level of administrative costs, the effect on total welfare should be positive. 
Market Power via Price Determination 
Next, consider the case of producer groups being able to fix prices like a monopolist. 
Dealing with differentiated products for which quantity and market volumes are often 
limited, it seems plausible to consider the group of  producers being able to coordinate 
its  activities and decide  jointly some strategicvariables, such as  price.22  When producers 
jointly determine the price of the  high-quality commodity, the profit-maximization 
equation becomes: 
max x  = pHDH(s,  p) - nH 
PH 
Given the constant-returns-to-scale technology,23  represented by the parameter n,, 
the aggregate supply of high-quality producers is nHqH  = &,(pH).  For market equilib- 
rium, P(s,  p) = &,(pH),  and the maximization equation becomes the following: 
Thus the welfare levels to be compared to the situation prior to the regulation, after 
solving for the optimal price and the equilibrium prices and quantities, are as  follows. 
PROPOSITION  4. With monopolisticprice determination, consumers'surplus is lower 
after the regulation. Production and  surplus are higher for high-quality producers 
and  lower for low-quality producers. 
Compared with the  competitive case, the  distribution of the  welfare impact is shifted. 
Consumers are able to make informed choices, but are  hindered by the exercise of mar- 
ket power by producers, as with land restrictions (figure 4).24  In addition, although the 
"As reported by Hayes, Lence, and Stoppa (2002), according to some estimates, the costs of (only)  certification and inspec- 
tion for specialty products are about 1%  of the value of the product. 
22  Recently, the Italian Antitrust Authority investigated the producer groups of  Parma and San Daniele hams and of 
Gorgonzola cheese because they imposed quantity restrictions on their members (Esposito, 1998). The paper considers the 
case of price determination, and not that of quantity determination, because it would likely be more difficult to detect and 
sanction for antitrust infractions. However, with vertical differentiation models, the qualitative nature of the analysis is very 
similar when considering quantity or price competition (Motta, 1993). 
=Another interesting situation,  suggested  by a referee, would be when industrycosts  are nothomogeneous,  e.g., increasing 
returns. In this case, the results could be different than those presented here. However, without a proper analysis, it is 
difficult  to formulate an  educated guess of the welfare effects because of the interaction between the market structure  emerg- 
ing from the non-homogeneous technology and the effects of the label. 
"  Figure 4 has the same parameter values of figure 1, and thus can be directly compared. With price determination, we 
obtain a different result than Marette, Crespi, and Schiavina (1999), who hd  that in many instances the welfare increase 
following the provision of information by the cartel of high-quality producers more than  offsets the reduction in welfare due 
to output reduction by the cartel itself. Note that Marette et al.'s paper considers a cartel of  only two high-quality firms 
competing with a competitive hge  of low-quality firms. 162  April 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
+  H Producer surplus 
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Figure 4. Welfare impact with price determination 
surplus impact is less detrimental for low-quality producers, the total welfare impact 
is worse than with competitive markets (figure 3).25 
High-quality producers make decisions based on a marginal revenue schedule,  ensur- 
ing them a markup over marginal cost, which translates into an  upward shifting of the 
demand for low-quality producers, who may now sell a higher quantity at  a higher price 
but without the markup above marginal cost.26  These results confirm the assertion of 
Anania and Nisticb (2002, p.  19) that "the interests involved in the introduction of a 
regulation go well beyond those of the producers of the high-quality good and involve 
other interests which may easily be stronger and more widespread ...." Moreover, with 
a fully credible certification, the distribution of benefits is  found to depend on the market 
structure and other policy details. 
Concluding Remarks 
This analysis considers the welfare impact of  the introduction of  the EU regulation 
which allows producers of agricultural commodities  with specific characteristics to differ- 
entiate and  label their products accordingly.  With a model ofvertical differentiation and 
a fully credible certification system, findings show that the introduction of the  regulation, 
in combination with the emergence of two distinct competitive markets for the  differen- 
tiated commodity, leaves both consumers and high-quality producers unambiguously 
better off, while producers of the low-quality commodity are  unambiguously worse off. 
25 Under monopolistic price determination, it  is always true that the total impact of the regulation is worse than under the 
competitive scenario, no matter the parameter values. However, the comparison with the case of land restrictions gives a 
ranking dependent on parameters. 
26 One may wonder whether there could be parameter values leading to collusion so profound it translates into a demand 
shiR for low-quality  producers so large as to actually increase profits compared with before the regulation. We checked with 
extremely low-quality ditrerences (0.1%) and very high-cost ditrerences  (500%),  confirming the surplus level for low-quality 
producers is always lower after the regulation. Zago and Pick  Labeling Policies in Food Markets  163 
In addition, when the administrative costs of  the regulation are relatively high and 
quality differences low but still relatively expensive to obtain, the total impact of  the 
regulation on economic welfare can be negative. With market power, either in the form 
of  land restrictions or joint price determination, the impact on consumers is negative, 
worsening total welfare effects, notwithstanding  an overall positive impact for producers, 
thus making the regulation more acceptable by producers in less favorable production 
areas. Because the results of the study are more general, the analysis can easily be 
extended to encompass other similar emerging issues in food markets. 
To  avoid potential negative welfare effects, we believe decisions on these matters 
should pass a cost-benefit analysis. Empirical work in this area is scarce, but applied 
economists should be well equipped to estimate the critical pieces of  information on 
consumers' and producers' surplus, together with program costs. Particular care should 
be given to analysis of  the degree of  competition in specialty product markets. 
A few considerations  which may represent further caveats of the regulation are  worth 
noting. High-quality production increases following the regulation: if this reallocation 
requires a higher use of  inputs, it may translate into a worsening of the environmental 
impact of agricultural production.27  The regulation also is intended to benefit rural 
communities in less developed areas of the EU. This can occur only if producers of 
high-quality commodities are located in  these marginal areas. We believe this is not 
always the case,"  and in some instances the regulation under examination could 
give the opposite results than expected by those fostering rural development in mar- 
ginal areas. 
For political economy constraints, policy makers and antitrust authorities at  the EU 
and national levels could be more lenient toward monopolistic behavior of  producers. 
With the exercise of market power by high-quality  producers, the negative impact of the 
regulation on low-quality producers  would be reduced." A related issue is that national 
antitrust authorities may have contrasting attitudes in different EU countries. The 
varied attitudes of  national authorities may depend on the political clout and relative 
importance of the ago-food sector in each country. In addition, the concern for national 
consumers may avoid the antitrust intervention for those specialty  products with a larger 
share of exports. But these considerations pose the problem of  a different treatment for 
a possibly similar behavior, and the allocation of jurisdiction at the national or inter- 
national level (Neven and Roller, 2000). 
In concluding,  we must add that some citizens, and hence policy makers, may attach 
a value to specialty products per se. For example, some may want to buy a specialty 
product because they care about a particular region or production process, or because 
they are afraid of losing biodiversity in the form of  those animal and vegetable species 
or cultivars deemed endangered in developed countries.  We do not take into account this 
27 There are instances in which better recognition  of quality commodities and the higher price they can command has led 
to more intense use ofpesticides (Cherobin  and Zago, 2000). There is, however, no acknowledgment  of this effect at  the policy 
or research levels. 
In Italy, for example, over 70% of turnover for high-quality meats is from Prosciutto of Parma (Parma's.ham), and over 
two-thirds of  high-quality cheese turnover  comes from Parmiggiano Reggiano (Parmesan cheese) and Grana Padano 
(Nomisma,  2000, p. 34). These specially products, probably the most famous ones, are located in the Padana Valley, certainly 
not a marginal area in terms of rural development. 
"This could make the regulationmore accepted by EU producers  in less favorable  production  areas. Only consumers  would 
be worse off, but they are likely not very well organized to lobby, especially on issues related to products consideredgourmet 
delicatessen within a local market. In addition, it could have a different impact when considering the international trade 
dimension (see Bureau, Gozlan, and Marette, 2001; Jansen and de Faria, 2002). 164  April 2004  Journal of  Agricultural and Resource Economics 
sort of externality, but believe it  would deserve a thorough analysis-which  might change 
both the magnitude and the nature of the results presented here. 
[Received  July 2003;final revision received November 2003.1 
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